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1. Introduction  
 
Governments in a growing number of jurisdictions have to deal with many individual 
contracts with bus operators. The contract areas being serviced are typically the result of 
antecedents in which public and/or private operators were given assumed grandfather 
monopoly rights to provide services in a spatial setting. In the Sydney context, for example, 
private operators have invested heavily in their businesses over many years, carrying 
growing risks while receiving some financial support from government through a range of 
subsidies and concession reimbursements. 
 
There is a desire of government in some countries to amalgamate contracts to both reduce 
the administrative burden of regulating many contracts as well as to support a belief that 
fewer but larger contracts would produce large economies from network integration1. A 
2003-04 review of the bus sector in News South Wales (Ministry of Transport 2004) 
promoted the idea of 15 contract areas for Sydney (down from 87), and a requirement that 
incumbent operators in each of these areas work out a plan to deliver services under a 
single contract. These services are divided into local and regional services (the latter serving 
government-defined strategic corridors that operate within and between contract areas). 
The regulator will then work with a single operating entity per contract area. This proposal 
has recently been implemented as part of the NSW Public Transport Amendment (Bus 
Reform) Bill 2004 with effect from January 1, 2005. 
 
This paper takes a close look at how one might structure a business proposition between a 
single entity interfacing with government upstream and with each operator downstream. 
We begin with an overview of the issues to be taken into account by the operating parties 
when entering into a cooperative venture. This is followed by the development of a 
framework within which to evaluate the features of a business proposition that are most 
preferred by each operator when entering an alliance and the extent to which specific 
attributes define barriers to cooperation. We are as much interested in the power 
relationships that will inevitably exist (and degrees of trust and mistrust), as we are in the 
influence that differences in the operating performance of operators required to work 
together under a single contract will have on the outcome.  
 
We use the stated choice experimental design method to identify the determining 
influences of each participating operator in a new area management contract and what 
contract specification appears to offer the best outcome to all parties in a cooperative 
venture.2 We seek to identify operator preferences and potential barriers to cooperation. 
                                                          
1 In the 2003-04 review of the private bus industry in NSW, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) used an analogy in which it was 
suggested that combining operators in an area into one large operator is like building a road where we have sub-contractors. We 
find the analogy misleading. The road building example brings together specialists who support each others’ particular expertise 
and as such add huge value along the supply chain. In the case of requiring geographically adjacent bus operators to work as one 
operator, however, we are not bringing specialists together (the economy of scope argument), rather we are adding up the same 
types of expertise (albeit with some slight differences in terms of performance).  
2 In assessing the potential gains from spatial aggregation, we must be careful to not attribute any found net gains to this alone, 
since an important element of the reform process has been the introduction of a performance-based contract regime in which 
operator’s are required to deliver baseline services under benchmark best practice, with incentive payments for additional services 
and patronage growth (Ministry of Transport 2004).  
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2. Structuring a business proposition for area 
management contracts (AMCs) 
 
A requirement for incumbent operators to work together (including options for buy outs) 
in order to comply with the government’s new reform agenda is, in the Sydney context, a 
very challenging ask for many operators. Spatially adjacent operators in Sydney do not have 
a strong history of cooperation, and indeed there are many examples of hostility and 
criticism of specific operators who are poor performers and/or do not have a strong 
commitment to the global interests of the industry as a whole. The buying in from 
international players since the late 1990s has added to this concern, given that the 
shareholders are off shore and often have limited interest in the local market other than to 
minimize costs and repatriate profits3. 
 
Despite the clear statement by government that there are no ‘grandfather monopoly rights’ 
within existing regions, incumbent operators who currently operate services in locations 
that have been deemed by government to be part of a new area contract regard their status 
as providing them with rights to current and future business (i.e., passengers) within the 
“home region”. These rights may however be sold at a price to other operators who are 
transiting the home region, perhaps on corridor routes newly established under the 
legislation. Such operators may wish to carry transit passengers through the home region, 
or to pick-up new passengers within the home region. The hope of the new legislation in 
Sydney is that the alliance, through an AMC, will promote patronage through increased 
connectivity and frequency associated with the corridors and through reduced costs 
associated with longer corridor routes and improved business practices resulting from the 
lead of better operators. 
 
Contracts between the separate operators might define the outcomes of such inter-alliance 
transactions. For example, the fees/km for passenger rights in the home region could 
reflect the profitability/km, set at Fcr and Fl for cross regional and local passengers 
respectively. In this environment all operators would trade “home” rights for “foreign” 
rights. One challenge in establishing an area management contract is to determine a set of 
F’s to deliver revenue sharing within the alliance that will be acceptable to each operator 
and maximize the new rewards to each alliance member.  
 
Given that a new layer of trusting partnership between common-contract operators will 
emerge under the reform process, operators will have to work co-operatively if they wish to 
continue in the industry. There are a number of structural relationships that could be 
formalized. Given that each incumbent operator is a candidate participant, we might 
describe their status as a “lending” operator who would allow “borrowing” operators (be 
they the new business entity, another incumbent operator or even a third party contractor) 
to carry passengers within the “home” area and to do “exporting” business therein. Where 
such co-operative work occurs within a sub-group of operators, the sub-group can be 
defined as an amalgamation, and the amalgamated unit (which ‘legally owns’ the AMC) 
would be the only interacting agent with the regulator, rather than the separate operators. 
 
An operator carrying passengers within the home area has the only claim on the generated 
value, and equity principles should require that the lending operator be compensated for 
business conducted in the home area by borrowing operators. Within the unit, cross claims 
                                                          
3 Such commentary is factual, based on comments provided by a growing number of such businesses in Sydney. 
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can be established on the compensation account. The equity principles governing cross 
claims might include4:  
 
a) the separate legal entity principle under which each operator is recognized as a legal 
entity with a claim on value generated by itself or its assets (e.g., home operator 
claims for traversing and pick-up business undertaken by borrower operators 
within the home area);  
b) the group enterprise principle under which all operators have a claim on value 
generated by the functioning of the sub-group as a unit (e.g., the existence of the 
amalgamation may generate new patronage due to generally improved connectivity, 
and all operators in the group would have a claim on this value); and, 
c) the pari passu principle under which all operators are to be treated equally in the 
settlement of claims.  
 
When the alliance members are co-operative, the alliance might be expected to perform 
better than the two individual operators before the implementation of the review 
proposals5. A number of options for the distribution of alliance revenue could be 
considered (and their relationship to equity principles noted), for example: 
 
(a) Total alliance revenue could be distributed according to relative revenues before the 
implementation (no incentive to contribute) 
(b) Total alliance revenue could be distributed according to relative costs in alliance 
support activities (corridor, feeder); and non contributors would be assessed by 
isolated application of the funding model.  
(c) Same as (b) but contribution of patronage to an alliance corridor could be regarded 
as an alliance support activity.  
(d) If extra revenue is generated, members could be allocated the same revenue as 
before the implementation, and extra alliance revenue could be distributed 
according to relative costs in alliance support activities.  
 
                                                          
4 Transparency is also an important issue and is much more likely to prevail under the previous larger number of contract areas 
than with a few large areas. There are plenty of good local examples of scale producing cost inefficiencies without any 
compensating increase in service levels. For example, the performance levels with existing large operators such as the State 
Transit Authority (STA) and Westbus are not as good as smaller operators. Of particular interest is the purchase by Westbus of a 
smaller (80 vehicle fleet) and more efficient operator, Glenorie Buses and the decision to operate it separately in order to preserve 
its performance. Westbus, excluding the Glenorie business, went into voluntary administration on February 1, 2005 as a result of 
the failure of National Express (the UK main shareholder) to raise bank credit. What this suggests is that companies could still 
operate separately (with or without different livery etc.), yet still share a contract region under many legal entities. 
5 This is the expectation of the regulator. 
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The primary issue is defining the claims under (a) and (b)6. The options include:  
 
 A claim for traversing by borrower operators under (a) is compensation for not 
receiving passengers dropped-off for home operator pick-up at the home 
boundaries. The value of the traverse, VT, could be imputed net revenue per 
traversing passenger, given by a net fare component less the cost of pickup. The 
lender operator is entitled to a proportion PVT of VT.    
 A claim for pick-ups by borrower operators under (a) might be compensation for 
the borrowed passenger. The value of the pick-up, VPU, could be imputed net 
revenue for pickup, given by an average net fare component. The lender operator is 
entitled to a proportion PVPU of VPU.   (Note:  we may have PVPU = PVT ) 
 A claim for generated group business might be imputed from a comparison of pre- 
and post-amalgamation business, GB. All operators are entitled to an equal share of 
GB. 
 
Within the context of an agreed area management company, issues that need to be 
captured in the development of a model to reveal participating operator preferences and 
hence potential barriers to cooperation under an AMC include the structure of equity, the 
basis of contribution, the splitting of income, the compliance by all members with the 
contract requirements, the resourcing of the AMC, the operational management of the 
company, fleet maintenance and service delivery requirements, sharing of growth, the 
nature and extent of an exit process and other financial matters such as taxation. These 
issues are candidates for the set of attributes in the design of the stated choice experiment 
designed to reveal operator preferences for alternative AMC structures and the potential 
barriers to cooperation where preferences diverge widely on specific attributes and their 
levels. 
 
The business proposition sketched out above offers a possible way of giving incumbent 
operators first call on servicing a common-contract area as an alternative to a single entity, 
while recognizing the existing contract area arrangements and putting to the test the ability 
of operators to cooperate in a spatial alliance as an alternative to forced sale to a single 
operator, be it one of the existing incumbents or an outsider. 
 
3. Revealing operator preferences for a cooperative 
alliance through an AMC 
 
Each operator brings to the negotiation table a set of preferences that represent how they 
want to see their organization participate in a new area management company (AMC). 
These preferences are assumed to be consistent with a business-specific utility 
maximization rule. Through negotiation however, each participating operator may have to 
                                                          
6 A secondary issue, not considered herein, is defining a process to settle the cross claims. A simple model would determine PVT 
and PVPU, within acceptable bounds, to ensure a resolution. If no resolution is available, a payout rate, pi, for each borrowing 
operator could be determined by a simple model. In the Sydney case where operator losses may be usual, resolution may involve 
losses. The regulator would negotiate with the amalgamated unit which would present the case for subsidies as influenced by 
resolution values of PVT and PVPU.  
 negotiate with the amalgamated unit which would present the case for subsidies as influenced by resolution values of PVT and 
PVPU.  
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make compromises to arrive at set of agreements that will enable the AMC to fulfill its 
obligations under the new area contract.  
 
We propose the following model system as a way of establishing the preferences of each 
operator and the role that each operator’s individual preferences play in establishing the 
group preference function. 
 
Stage 1: Each operator participates in a stated choice experiment with common choice sets 
but with permissible different information processing strategies (IPSs). The behavioural 
process assumes that each operator acts as if they are a utility maximiser. The operator-
specific models define utility expressions of the form: U(alt i, operator q) i=1,…,J; 
q=1,…,Q where alt defines an alternative business proposition for the AMC. For example, 
with two operators and three alternative business propositions we have U(a1q1), U(a2q1), 
U(a3q1) for operator 1 and U(a1q2), U(a2q2), U(a3q2) for operator 2. An unlabelled stated 
choice design (see below) will be established to parameterise this independent-utility-
maximising choice model, conditional on the IPS of the respondent. 
 
The relative attribute preservation of the IPS of the respondent is identified by prompting 
respondents to indicate the attributes that were ignored or given little attention for each 
business proposition. Simple questions about the IPS enacted by respondents within each 
choice set can be used to test a range of IPS choice models of varying complexity (see 
Hensher 2004, DeShazo and Fermo 2004).  This information is used to condition the utility 
expressions as follows: ignored attributes are assigned a marginal utility of zero for a given 
alternative and choice set7.  
 
The base utility expressions (i.e., without any interaction effects or direct covariate effects) 
are of the general form: 
 
Uqj = αj + βqjk * xqjk + εj, (1) 
 
where xqjk is a vector of design attributes associated with operator q and business 
proposition j, βqjk is the corresponding vector of random marginal utility parameters, αj is 
an alternative-specific constant (which is omitted in the case of an unlabelled experiment) 
and j represents the unobserved effects.  The effect of the IPS used by a respondent for a 
given choice set is implementing by setting βqjk = 0 if k is ignored for a business 
proposition j for operator q. The mean and the standard deviation of the random 
preference parameters βqjk across the sample of operators can both be decomposed, and 
hence explained, by deliberation attributes such as the number of years involved in the 
business, whether an operator is a family-based or multinational business; prior experience 
in alliances, and general IPS-related information such as the number of attributes ignored. 
Regardless of which approach is adopted, such contextual influences can also be interacted 
with design attributes in model estimation. This modelling structure lends itself to the 
heterogenous mixed logit (HML) model, which is our econometric model of choice for this 
methodology, detailed in Section 4. 
 
                                                          
7 Cognitive burden is often cited as a reason for ignoring (or paying little attention) to specific attributes. There is a lack of 
evidence to suggest that cognitive burden associated with a stated choice task is any different (or additive to) that which 
influences specific individuals in all the decisions they make in real markets. 
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Stage 2: All parameters estimated from stage 1 are fixed and imported8 into a joint operator 
model. For example, with two operators and three business propositions, there are nine 
joint business propositions – U(a1a1), U(a1a2), U(a1a3),…., U(a3a1), U(a3a2), U(a3a3), referred 
to as propositions p=1,…,P.  Three of the joint business propositions imply non-
negotiated cooperation (i.e. U(a1a1), U(a2a2) , U(a3a3)). The stage 2 choice is between 
combinations of operator-specific business propositions with one business proposition the 
chosen pair.  
 
A model is then specified of the following form (for two operators, q, _q): 
 
U(a1a1) = ASCa1a1 +λqp*( β1qx1q + β2qx2q + ...) + (1-λqp)*( β1_qx1_q + β2_qx2_q + ...) 
 
U(a1a3) = ASCa1a3 +λqp*( β1qx1q + β2qx2q + ...) + (1-λqp)*( β1_qx1_q + β2_qx2_q + ...) (2) 
 
U(a3a3) = ASCa3a3 +λqp*( β1qx1q + β2qx2q + ...) + (1-λqp)*( β1_qx1_q + β2_qx2_q + ...) 
 
The power measures for operators q and _q sum to one, making comparisons of operator 
types straightforward.  If the two power measures are equal for a given attribute mix defining 
a proposition (i.e., λqp = (1 - λqp) =.5), then group choice equilibrium is not governed by a 
dominant operator with respect to proposition p.  In other words, regardless of the power 
structure governing other attributes, operator types q and _q tend to reach perceptively fair 
compromises when bridging the gap in their preferences for each proposition.  If the 
power measures are significantly different across operator types (e.g., λqp > (1 - λqp) for two 
operators), then λqp gives a direct measure of the dominance of one operator type over the 
other with respect to attribute mix in proposition p; as λqp increases, so does the relative 
power held by operator type q over _q.  For example, the power measures may reveal that 
one operator type tends to get its way with regard to monetary concerns, whereas the other 
operator type tends to get its way with regard to concerns for levels of service.  These 
relationships can be examined further at the sub-type level (by decomposition of the 
random parameter specification of λ), in order to reveal deviations from the inferred 
behaviour at the sample level that may be present for a particular type of relationship. 
 
This model is straightforward to estimate, holding all β’s fixed, with each λqp and the 
alternative-specific constants (ASC’s) free parameters.  λqp as a power indicator can be a 
random parameter and a function of other criteria, especially the deliberation attributes, 
and can be specific to each attribute within and/or between business propositions, or 
constrained as the analyst sees fit.  
 
In the current study with a small illustrative data set, we will not be estimating stage 2 on 
actual pairs in real contract contexts (left to future research), since we will need lot of pairs 
or triples of operators to obtain enough data. We will however be able to identify specific 
operators (disguised as operator 1, 2, 3 etc.) and use the findings for each operator to 
establish the extent to which they would cooperate if they were required to work together 
under a single AMC.  Stage 2 could be implemented by randomly assigning operators to 
pairs and establishing the nature of the power relationship under this condition. This is still 
useful and establishes the value of the method. 
                                                          
8 The alternative-specific constants may not be imported. 
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4. The heteroscedastic mixed logit operator 
preference model9  
 
We assume that a sampled operator q (q=1,…,Q) faces a choice among J business 
propositions in each of T choice situations. Operator q is assumed to consider the full set 
of offered business propositions in choice situation t and to choose the business 
propositions with the highest utility. The utility associated with each alternative j as 
evaluated by each operator q in choice situation t, is represented in a discrete choice model 
by a utility expression of the general form in (3).  
 
jtq q jtq jtqU ′= + εxβ , (3) 
 
where xjtq is the vector of explanatory variables, including attributes of the alternatives, 
characteristics of the business and descriptors of the decision context and choice task itself 
in choice situation t. The components βq and εjtq are not observed by the analyst and are 
treated as stochastic influences.  Note that βq is assumed to vary across operators. 
 
Operator-specific heterogeneity is introduced into the utility function through βq Thus, 
 
βq  =  β + Δzq + Γqvq  =  β + Δzq + ηq,  (4) 
 
or βqk = βk + δk′zq + ηqk  where βqk is the random parameter whose distribution over 
operators depends in general on underlying parameters, zq is observed data and the random 
vector ηq endows the random parameter with its stochastic properties. For convenience in 
isolating the model components, we define vq to be a vector of uncorrelated random 
variables with known variances and denote the matrix of known variances of the random 
draws as W. 
 
Since βq may contain business-proposition specific constants, ηqk may also vary across choices 
and, in addition, may thus induce correlation across choices.  Note that βq and its components 
are structural parameters (β,Δ,Γq) and choice situation invariant characteristics of the 
individual, zq.  They do not vary across choice situations or across choices (save for the extent 
that components of xjtq are choice specific).  The terms β + Δzq accommodate heterogeneity 
in the mean of the distribution of the random parameters.  Previous applications of the 
mixed logit model have assumed homoscedasticity in the model, which results if Γq is 
assumed to be a matrix of constants.  Then,  
 
Var[βq | zq]  =  ΓΣ1/2WΣ1/2Γ ′ (5) 
 
We will assume that Γ is an unrestricted lower triangular matrix.  Thus, with no loss of 
generality, we assume that W is diagonal and contains no unknown parameters. Variance 
heterogeneity is introduced into the model as follows:  Let Σq = Diag[σ1q,σ2q,…,σKq] where 
 
σqk  =  σk × exp(θk′hq) (6) 
                                                          
9 This section is based on Greene, Hensher and Rose (in press). 
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and hq is a vector of M variables that enters the variances.  With this explicit scaling, we 
now assume that the diagonal elements of Γ are equal to one (again, with no loss of 
generality, since the scaling will now appear in Σq).  The full model for the variances in the 
model is given as equation (7). 
 
Var[βq|Ω, zq,hq] = Φq = ΓΣq1/2 WΣq1/2 Γ′ (7) 
 
where Ω = (β,Δ,Γ,Σ,W), the component structural parameters of βq. We now have a 
functional form for an attribute in which its preference profile across a sample is 
represented by a mean and a standard deviation expression of the general form: 
 
βq  = ± exp[β0 + δk′zq +  σk × exp(θk′hq)*vi] (8) 
 
where the sign for the entire expression is imposed by the analyst to represent the 
behaviourally required sign, vq is an analytical distribution selected by the analyst, and all 
other terms are defined above.  
 
The mixed logit class of models assumes a general distribution for βqk and an IID extreme value 
type 1 distribution for εjtq. That is, βqk can take on different distributional forms. For a given 
value of βq, the conditional (on zq, hq and vq) probability for choice j in choice situation t is 
multinomial logit, since the remaining random term, εtjq, is IID extreme value:  
 
Pjtq(choice j  |Ω,Xtq,zq,hq,vq) = exp(βq′xjtq) / Σjexp(βq′xjtq) (9) 
 
where the full set of attributes and characteristics is gathered in Xtq = [x1tq,x2tq,…,xJtq].   
 
5. In-depth Interviews used to reveal the agenda 
 
To guide the selection of attributes and associated levels for the stated preference study, 
designed to reveal operator preferences for cooperative alliances in an Area Management 
Company (AMC), we undertook, in late 2004, extensive in depth interviews with a number 
of owners and managers of private bus businesses in Sydney who are participants in the 12 
area contract regions not managed by the government operator. We summarize the main 
points, preserving the confidential nature of the material in respect of specific AMCs that 
were being worked out at the time of the interviews.  
 
The in depth interviews were unstructured and guided by very general background themes 
designed to provide a starting position for discussion. For example, one background theme 
used to stimulate dialogue was the perceived role that each operator might play in an AMC; 
another was alternative ways that each operator might measure their contribution for 
purposes of sharing revenue and costs. The information gathered was sorted so as to reveal 
the diversity of the agenda of each operator and a natural grouping of themes that can be 
translated into specific attributes for inclusion in the stated preference study. 
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5.1 Top-of-mind issues 
 
Operators in NSW do not confine their discussion of cooperative issues to their present 
individual circumstances, and this more general approach is a result of the fluidity and 
uncertainty in the bus services environment that has resulted from the introduction of 
recent reform.  Area participants and even area boundaries are rapidly changing as 
individual operators come to terms with the impact of reform, and further changes are 
expected when contracts are renewed in seven years time.  As a result, operators are able to 
comment on a broad range of initiatives and discuss their preferences under a range of 
hypothetical circumstances. 
 
Top-of-mind issues tend to follow two lines of discussion: anticipating and responding to 
the changing environment in the short-term; and establishing and strengthening the inter-
operator partnerships which are seen as the inevitable outcome of reform in the longer 
term.   
 
In the short-term, a number of aspects of the newly introduced reform remain unclear to 
operators, and the potential impact of new contractual requirements and payment 
methodologies is the subject of much speculation.  Of particular interest are the threat of 
individual operator exit and the impact of fare standardization across the metropolitan area, 
as well as the tentative steps that have been taken to form the area-based contractual 
arrangements that are required by government.  Examples of the latter include investigation 
of contractual options for partnership, the establishment of within-area boundaries in 
consultation with partner companies to avoid conflict over new patronage areas, and the 
apportionment of centralized assets such as depots to multiple new contract areas (for 
operators who will participate in more than one area under the new regime). 
 
While operators spontaneously discuss in detail the likely response to reform over the 
coming months, longer-term considerations are also top-of-mind.  Quality partnership 
relationships are seen as the key to long-term survival, and operators are anxious to either 
rapidly build these relationships or limit their exposure to partnership failure.  Preferred 
long-term response to reform is highly polarized, with some (mostly small) operators 
aiming to form close alliances with partners, and other (larger, international) operators 
intending to buy out partners where possible.  Both groups of operators share concerns 
about potential barriers to cooperation, including the extent to which all partners have an 
ongoing commitment to the industry (long-term rather than short-term focus) and the 
professionalism of partners’ operations. Operators provide examples of perceived 
professional shortfalls including the misuse of confidential data, insufficient management 
skills (particularly in the financial arena), inefficient or ineffective operations and 
insufficient planning for growth of patronage and services. 
 
5.2 Formation of an Area Management Company (AMC) 
 
Most operators, at the time of the interview were in the process of establishing a lead 
entity, as required by government, and a number of models were under discussion. At one 
end of the spectrum, a single operator becomes the lead entity, subcontracting bus services 
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to other operators in the area.  At the other extreme is the formation of a fully integrated 
AMC, a new company formed to take advantage of the benefits of a fully-fledged alliance. 
In between these extremes is a range of options, such as the establishment of a “shelf” 
company designed to meet the government’s minimum requirements: receive revenue, split 
income among partner operators (in a manner not finalized by most operators) and report 
to the regulator. The preferred model depends greatly on both the relative power of the 
operators in each area and perceived benefits and barriers to cooperative alliance.  Major 
points of difference among operators in their perceptions of these benefits and barriers will 
now be discussed. 
 
5.3 Shareholding and voting rights 
 
Loss of control of the business entity is a major barrier to alliance for most operators, and 
particularly for smaller operators.  The shareholding and voting rights on offer in any 
proposed AMC is therefore of great importance to operators, and can be expected to shape 
their preferences for an alliance model.  Shareholding options for an AMC include equal 
shares, shares based on operator size (measured in either bus kilometers, bus numbers or 
number of passengers), or shares based on size with the opportunity for smaller companies 
to buy out a portion of a larger company to ensure that no one company has majority 
ownership of the AMC. 
 
Similarly, there are a number of options for apportionment of voting rights at the board 
level of the AMC, including equal votes, votes based on size of the business, or votes based 
on size but capped at 50% to ensure that no majority operator is able to dictate terms to 
minority partners. 
 
Shareholding and voting right preferences influence operators’ preferences for an AMC 
model in similar ways, and voting rights is selected as an attribute for inclusion in the stated 
preference study. 
 
5.4 Benefits of alliance 
 
It is clear from discussion with operators that the potential benefits of alliance with area 
partners have not yet been examined in detail, with most operators focusing on the short-
term aspects of meeting government requirements.  To a large extent this reflects the fact 
that operators are not able to choose their partners, and many operators see the forced 
amalgamation as an exercise in limiting the costs of alliance rather than reaping the 
benefits.  In practical terms, this means limiting the resources allocated to the preferred 
AMC model as much as possible. 
 
When prompted, however, operators suggest a number of ways that an alliance could 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness, including use of common systems, standardization of 
policy and procedures and performance monitoring, and centralization of decision making 
and strategic planning, financial management, network planning and integration, marketing, 
procurement and human resource management.  Interestingly, maintenance is not generally 
viewed as a function suited to central provision by an AMC, as duplication of maintenance 
services is not seen as costly when compared with the potential increases in dead running 
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time that would be the expected result of centralized maintenance.  It is suggested that this 
view may change if the industry develops ‘super-specialists’ as a result of reform, possibly 
driven by operators selling off their contracted services and offering specialist support back 
to the sector. This strategy enables operators with substantial skills to offer to be removed 
from the uncertainties of contracts with government. 
 
Another interesting point raised is that the amalgamated contracts that commenced in 
January 200510 are seen as containing incentives not to consolidate assets (i.e., if assets such 
as depots are being used to determine costs and hence subsidy, the value of potential 
efficiencies needs to be weighed against loss of subsidy). 
 
Taking advantage of potential alliance benefits would involve transfer of resources (both 
human and financial) to the AMC.  As transferred personnel would be likely to relinquish 
their roles in their original companies (taking with them some of the value of the business), 
the decision to integrate the AMC to this level may not be completely reversible and would 
not be taken lightly.  Operators are divided over the extent to which integration should 
occur, with some advocating no integration (or limited only to government requirements) 
and others considering a more fully integrated alliance. 
 
Two attributes reflecting the alliance benefits perceived by operators are included in the 
stated preference model.  The first attribute details the extent to which operations of the 
partners are integrated (from not at all through to full integration covering all aspects of the 
business).  This attribute indicates the influence of operators’ expectations of the extent to 
which benefits can be obtained through alliance; along similar lines, the second attribute 
examines the extent to which management skills are transferred to a proposed AMC, 
reflecting the influence of operators’ willingness to resource an AMC (in return for 
perceived benefits) on preference for an AMC model. 
 
5.5 Relinquishing ‘grandfather’ rights 
 
Operators view themselves as owning rights to service specific routes, and have an 
expectation that these rights will be maintained, traded or sold under the amalgamated 
contract regime.  These historical rights are not recognized by government – rights are 
assigned to the area instead – and it is interesting to note that operators do not 
spontaneously discuss future rationalization of historical rights within their area. 
 
When prompted, operators agree that an AMC will need to make changes to the status quo 
to take advantage of area-wide efficiencies, but are divided about how this should occur 
once the initial area contract has been signed.  Rationalization is expected to result in route 
changes that disadvantage specific operators, and the maintenance of an equitable 
partnership will mean that some sort of compensation will be required, although one 
operator suggests that changes will be accepted as long as each partner’s margins remain 
unchanged.  Operators debate when (if at all) historical rights should be relinquished to the 
AMC, with some proposing that rights should be transferred from operators to the AMC 
immediately and others preferring to retain their rights for a period of time (most operators 
in the second category feel that this transfer will have to be made eventually). 
 
                                                          
10 As of February 5, 2005, only one operator (Connex) had signed their contract with an EBIT:costs margin built into the seven 
year contract of 6-7.5%. Other operators are not willing to accept such a low margin, arguing for 11-13% (Hensher 2005a). 
Spatial Alliances of Public Transit Operators: Establishing operator preferences for area 
management contracts with Government 
Hensher & Knowles 
 
12 
An attribute is included in the stated preference model that differentiates between 
preferences for immediate and longer-term transfer of operators’ historical rights to 
operate specific routes. 
 
5.6 Managing area growth 
 
Operators anticipate revenue and patronage growth based on changes in demography and 
government policy (a short-term example is fare standardization) and, to a lesser extent, 
alliance cooperation.  As this growth will be attributable to the area, represented by the 
AMC, rather than to individual operators, distribution of revenue thus generated to area 
partners is an area of contention. 
 
Options presented by operators for sharing revenue growth include: sharing on the basis of 
costs incurred, in terms of the number of bus kilometers provided by each company to 
achieve the growth; sharing in a way that maintains operator relativities in terms of size, 
measured by the transport task in terms of bus kilometers, passenger kilometers or bus 
numbers; sharing in a way that maintains relative profit margins of each operator; or 
sharing equally. 
 
The way in which area growth is shared among operators is included as an attribute in the 
stated choice model. 
 
5.7 Managing differences in operator performance 
 
A major barrier to cooperation is the perception of operators that there are widely differing 
levels of performance within the bus service industry, and operators (both large and small) 
are quick to point out that size is not a reflection of efficiency.  As operators within an area 
face similar constraints, operators expect that alliance partners’ costs will converge over 
time. 
 
In the mean time, operators are faced with a decision about how an AMC, which is paid by 
government at a single rate, should split this revenue among operators with differing 
operating costs.  Suggestions include: paying operators an average of the operating costs 
within the contract area (forcing relatively high cost operators to reduce their costs to 
remain viable, and giving lower cost operators additional profit incentives); paying 
operators the highest operating cost within the contract area (covering all costs, but 
providing strong profit incentives); paying operators the costs of the area’s best practice 
operator (as determined by the AMC – this could potentially be the highest cost operator 
when aspects other than cost, such as service quality, are considered); or paying operators 
according to their individual operating costs (with no incentive for cost convergence). 
 
The way in which operators are paid by the AMC where operator costs differ is included as 
an attribute in the stated choice model. 
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5.8 Asset ownership 
 
Ownership of assets (buses, depots etc.) is a recurrent theme of discussion, with operators 
expressing the view that the government’s long-term desire is to acquire all assets from 
private operators as part of a strategy to eliminate any claim on spatial service provision 
other than an entitlement to operate a service on behalf of government. Operators are 
either for or against government ownership of assets, although even those operators 
strongly advocating government ownership are concerned that government will not pay a 
reasonable rate for assets (particularly those over 15 years old).  Some operators view 
contract amalgamation as the first step towards government acquisition, and in the longer 
term operators anticipate re-branding of buses along area lines – an expensive exercise, 
with each bus costing about $6,000 to repaint. There is no indication that government will 
cover this impost. 
 
Of more immediate concern to operators is the way that the fixed asset payment portion of 
operator revenue via the funding model is likely to be determined by government.  Under 
the new model, operators are concerned that government will base support on a pre-agreed 
(low) rate of return on investment (ROI), and any additional ROI will be claimed by the 
government.  Given the ongoing controversy on an acceptable ROI, this matter is 
emerging as a very serious one, threatening the commitment of operators to the new 
contracting regime. It is made worse by a claim on charter revenue that, although unrelated 
to the provisions of service and patronage under the new contracts, does use the assets 
funded by government in delivering contract services. 
 
Some operators express the view that the sooner government can acquire all assets and 
have operators manage them for government, the quicker this would reduce risk as well as 
change the current focus on asset management (Hensher 2005a); others are anxious to 
retain ownership of buses, which are used to secure finance.  Those operators advocating 
government ownership point to the success of similar regimes in Adelaide and Perth, 
which are very attractive financially to incumbent service providers (delivering some of the 
most attractive EBIT:cost margins in Australia). 
 
To capture the influence of asset ownership views on AMC model choice, ownership is 
included as an attribute in the stated preference model. 
 
5.9 Payment models 
 
The payment model to be used by government to provide revenue to the AMCs has not 
yet been fully articulated, however operators anticipate that there will be a component 
based on AMC costs as well as an incentive/penalty system providing patronage growth 
and service quality incentives. 
 
The basis for distribution of this revenue from the AMC to its constituent operators has 
not attracted much discussion to date.  There is a strong feeling that the distribution should 
be linked to the government’s payment model, when this becomes clear, to ensure 
transparency and fall in line with the revenue flows (given that government will collect all 
fares and return a shadow fare per passenger back to the operators). Distribution of 
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revenue relating to planned strategic corridors is expected to be more challenging, and 
options for doing this have not yet been considered. 
 
Operators indicate that the bulk of payment from government will be based on operator 
costs, allowing for an acceptable ROI; incentive and penalty payments are expected to play 
a limited, and potentially distorting, role.  For example, operators suggest that patronage 
incentives may result in optimization of Patronage Incentive Payments (PIPs), rather than 
patronage itself, as a result of PIP caps, while other operators feel that the service quality 
incentive is likely to be too challenging to earn, with too many hurdles to jump, and service 
quality incentives are not being factored into decision-making at present. 
 
For some operators, growth of patronage may prove problematic in any case: some 
operators do not believe they can grow patronage; and where patronage growth is 
anticipated (e.g., the cited 12% increase projected by government) there may be problems 
due to an insufficient number of passengers per bus trip. Other operators are optimistic 
about patronage growth: views appear to be highly area-dependent. 
 
Operators speculate about the likely nature of service quality incentives (SQIs) under the 
new payment model, suggesting that a single number (or rating) may be used to measure 
the service quality performance of AMCs.  This model would make it very difficult, in the 
absence of operator-specific data collected within an AMC, for the AMC to determine 
where any problems are originating (i.e., which company is at fault). 
 
To counter this problem, some operators are planning to measure their own performance, 
providing a way in which to split SQI payments within the company (sub-regional analysis). 
Such a model will have to be supported by the AMC and raises a substantial number of 
issues related to trust, commitment and responsibility. However, it is questionable whether 
all participating operators will be willing to concede that poor performance will mean a 
reduced incentive payment for that operator (or, even worse, a penalty payment from the 
operator to the AMC). Some operators indicate that there may be significant resistance to 
performance measurement within the alliance. 
 
Distribution to operators of both cost-based and incentive payments, as well as 
arrangements for paying any penalties where required, has not been much discussed, with 
operators waiting for more detail about the payment model.  Operators suggest that 
distribution could be based on operator costs or operator size (with no incentives for 
individual operators), or based on operator performance measured against a service level 
agreement with the AMC (incorporating incentives). 
 
To capture the influence of these issues on preferences for an AMC model, three attributes 
are included in the stated preference model: the way in which base (cost related) revenue is 
distributed by the AMC to operators; the way in which incentive payments are distributed 
by the AMC to operators; and the way in which penalty payments are paid by operators to 
the AMC (to pass on to the government when required). 
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5.10 Summary 
 
Interviews with operators suggest a number of attributes and attribute levels that are likely 
to influence operators’ choice of a preferred model for cooperative partnership in the form 
of an AMC.  The preferred model depends greatly on both the relative power of the 
operators in each area and perceived benefits and barriers to cooperative alliance.  
 
Although only tentative steps have been taken to form an AMC in new contract areas, 
partnership alliances are seen as the inevitable result of current reforms to the bus services 
industry in NSW.  Due to the uncertainty surrounding reform at present, partnership 
options are widely discussed and operators feel comfortable evaluating proposals that may 
provide partnership solutions in a variety of hypothetical circumstances. 
 
6. The stated preference study 
 
Stated preference (SP) is a methodological approach to studying choice behaviour. SP 
recognises that the revelation of preferences of operators should not be limited to choices 
made in real markets (referred to as revealed preference (RP) data). Rather, through the 
design of a preference experiment we can evaluate the operator’s preferences for 
combinations of levels of attributes associated with specific business propositions which 
include the current and new arrangement options.  
 
Importantly, SP models offer an enrichment strategy to study the preferences and choices 
of operators that are inadequately represented by RP data settings alone. We can ‘stretch’ 
the RP attribute levels to create greater variability in information than is typically observed 
in real market data and consequently add knowledge to our understanding of preference 
revelation and the role of such preferences in determining choices. This gives the analyst 
greater capability in applying a choice model outside of the limits imposed by the market 
data. The method is ideally suited to the current application where we are evaluating the 
preferences of business partners in the formation of a new business proposition, and where 
many of the issues are new to the industry and hence not observed in current practices. 
 
There are two broad categories of SP methods: (i) an operator is asked to indicate his 
preferences among a set of combinations of attributes which define services or products. This 
judgemental task, usually seeks a response on one of two metric scales - a rank ordering or 
a rating scale; (ii) an operator is asked to choose one of the combinations of attributes. 
Information is not sought on the ordering or rating of each of the non-chosen 
combinations. This is often called a first-preference choice task. 
 
In SP experiments, each combination of attributes can be defined as an alternative or business 
proposition in the sense of representing a product or service specification which may or may 
not be observed currently. It is feasible to vary both the combinations of attributes and 
levels as well as the subsets of mixes to be evaluated. This can be achieved by either 
designing varying numbers of combinations or asking the respondent to a priori eliminate 
any combinations which are not applicable before responding (soliciting criteria for non-
applicability - see Louviere et al., 2000).   
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In practice, it is common in preference experiments to hold the number of alternative 
attribute mixes (or business propositions) constant and only vary the attribute levels. 
However, in choice experiments, it is common to vary the number of alternatives, while 
either holding the attribute levels associated with each alternative constant, or varying 
them, producing varying choice sets. Fixed choice set designs are also widely used.  
 
The centrepiece of an SP study are the following elements: 
 
1. The identification of the set of attributes which need to be considered as sources of 
influence on the choice from the set of business propositions.  
2. Selecting the measurement unit for each attribute. In most cases the metric for an attribute 
is unambiguous; however there are situations where this requires consideration of 
alternative metrics.  
3. The specification of the number and magnitudes of attribute levels. As a rule of thumb, one 
should be extremely cautious about choosing attribute levels which are well outside 
the range of both current experience and believability. Pivotting the levels around 
known experiences gives greater confidence to the outputs. 
4. Statistical design is where the attribute levels are combined into an experiment. A 
combination of attribute levels describes a business proposition, referred to in the 
literature as a profile or treatment. Business propositions are generated with the aid of 
statistical design theory. In a statistical experiment each attribute has levels, and it is 
these levels that are the input data required to construct a factorial design (i.e., 
combinations of attribute levels for all attributes in the design). In practice the full 
number of combinations is impracticable to evaluate and so a fractional factorial design 
(ffd) is constructed. The price one pays for making the experiment manageable is 
that some statistical efficiency is lost. In designing a fractional factorial experiment, 
the analyst has to assume that certain interaction effects among the attributes are 
not statistically significant. This is a very reasonable non-testable assumption for a 
large number of possible interactions, especially interactions of more than two 
attributes (e.g., three-way interactions), and indeed for many two-way interactions. 
If interactions are statistically significant, their effects in an ffd will be loaded onto 
the individual main effects, giving erroneous results. This is referred to as confounding 
main effects with interaction effects. The analyst has to be creative in selecting a 
limited number of two-way interactions which enable one to include up to that 
number of interactions to test for statistical significance. 
5. The experiment designed in task 4 has to be translated into a set of questions in the 
data collection phase. The survey instrument can be administered in many ways such as 
a computer aided personal interview (CAPI), an internet survey (as used herein) or 
a paper and pencil exercise. Whatever the preferred collection strategy, the design 
must be translated from a set of orthogonal or near-orthogonal design-attribute 
levels into real information for operators to comprehend and respond. Where 
feasible, it is suggested that an operator be asked to both choose a business 
proposition and either rank or rate the full set of business propositions (or a subset 
derived from a prior question on applicability or non-applicability of particular 
propositions). The subset issue is particularly important where there are too many 
propositions to rank or rate, although it may be of interest in a choice response 
context to ascertain some additional information on relevant sets. If the request for 
ranking or rating responses may jeopardise the cooperation across the replications 
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of the experiment, it is more important to limit the task to the first preference 
choice.  
6. The selection of an appropriate estimation procedure will be dependent on the metric 
of the response variable and the level of aggregation of the data for modelling. The 
mixed logits model is proposed herein. 
 
6.1 Selecting the Attributes and Levels 
 
The attributes of relevance in defining a number of alternative business propositions that 
have been identified from the interviews with operators are set out below in Table 1. To 
establish their relevance, we undertook a survey of operators attending the joint Bus 
Industry Confederation (BIC) and UITP Asia-Pacific Conference in Brisbane in October 
2004. In this survey we asked operators to review a set of attributes and levels and to 
indicate which level on each of the attributes in Table 1 is most preferred (including an 
optional other level). 24 operators completed the survey, providing enough initial support 
for the attributes and levels in Table 1.  
 
There are ten attributes of which eight have 4 levels and two have 2 levels, giving us a 8422 
factorial design. We designed a series of business propositions, giving each operator two to 
consider in a scenario, and asking them to identify their most preferred business model. In 
addition we asked that “If I had the choice not to choose any of the above business 
models” would you still select the previously stated preference business model or select 
neither of the business models. This will be repeated a total of 14 times, varying the levels 
of the attributes for each business proposition. The business propositions are referred to as 
unlabelled propositions in that the mix of levels of attributes is nothing more than a bundle 
of attributes without a label.  
 
These attributes were designed into the internet  survey ‘Forming Bus Alliances’, with each 
participating bus operator asked to compare  the two business propositions (referred to as 
business models) and to choose the most preferred. This was repeated a total of 14 times, 
giving us 14 observations on each operator’s preferences for bundles of attributes. Figure 1 
is an example of a stated preference screen. 
 
Table 1:  Candidate Attributes and Levels 
1. Voting rights 
 Equal votes 
 Based on size of business (defined by bus numbers) 
 Based on size of business (defined by bus kilometres) 
 Based on size of business but capped (e.g. at 50%) 
2. Staffing 
 Management skills transferred to AMC 
 Management skills retained by individual operators 
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3. Sharing day to day operations 
 None at all 
 Limited (e.g. shared depots only to park/position buses) 
 Extensive (e.g. shared maintenance of all buses) 
 Substantial (e.g. all aspects of the business) 
4. Route allocation post AMC 
 Retain historical rights to operate certain routes 
 All rights transferred to AMC for reallocation as required 
5. Sharing regional growth amongst operators 
 Equally shared 
 Proportionately according to each operator's costs 
 Proportionately according to each operator's number of buses 
 According to profitability of each operator 
6. Dealing with differing operator costs 
 Operators paid an average of the operating costs within the contract area 
 Operators paid the highest operating cost within the contract area 
 Operators paid according to best practice operating cost of operators in the 
contract area. 
 Operators paid according to their individual operating costs 
7. Ownership of assets 
 All Owned and operated by each operator 
 All Owned by each operator, leased to AMC 
 All Owned by AMC, leased to each operator 
 All Owned by government and leased to AMC 
8. Revenue distribution based on 
 Operator costs 
 Operator size (bus numbers) 
 Operator performance (based on a Service Level Agreement with AMC) 
 Equal shares among operators 
9. Incentive payment/bonus distribution: 
 Operator costs 
 Operator size (bus numbers) 
 Operator performance (based on a Service Level Agreement with AMC) 
 Equal shares among operators 
10.  Penalty payment paid according to: 
 Operator costs 
 Operator size (bus numbers) 
 Operator performance (based on a Service Level Agreement with AMC) 
 Equal shares among operators 
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Figure 1:  An example of a stated preference screen 
 
Additional questions were asked to identify which attributes in the SP experiments were 
ignored and the ranking of the attributes. Contextual questions sought information on the 
operator including years in the industry, size of current operations, geographical location, 
ownership status of business, alliance experience, the attributes of an ideal alliance, and 
responsibilities of each operator and the area management company.  
 
7. Analysis and Findings of a Pilot Survey 
 
A total of 19 operators completed the online pilot survey, yielding 266 observations for 
model estimation (i.e., 14 choice sets by 19 bus operators). The final model is given in 
Table 2. This is illustrative given the small sample size and the pilot nature of this initial 
phase of a larger study. There were only two statistically significant effects11 – payments 
(where costs differ) based on best practice costs, and assets owned and operated by each 
operator within the AMC. For best practice costing, the distinction between metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan operator had an influence.  
 
The two significant effects are defined by random parameters, suggesting that preference 
heterogeneity is relevant. A constrained triangular distribution12 was selected as the 
preferred analytical distribution (from a number of other distributions assessed). 
                                                          
11 We have left the other attributes in Table 2 to illustrate the way in which each attribute level is assessed. With a larger sample 
we would expect to identify additional influences. 
12 For the triangular distribution, the density function looks like a tent: a peak in the centre and dropping off linearly on both sides 
of the centre. Let c be the centre and s the spread. The density starts at c-s, rises linearly to c, and then drops linearly to c+s. It is 
zero below c-s and above c+s. The mean and mode are c. The standard deviation is the spread divided by 6 ; hence the 
spread is the standard deviation times 6 . The height of the tent at c is 1/s (such that each side of the tent has area 
s×(1/s)×(1/2)=1/2, and both sides have area 1/2+1/2=1, as required for a density). The slope is 1/s2. This constraint specification 
can be applied to any distribution. For example, for a triangular with mean=spread, the density starts at zero, rises linearly to the 
mean, and then declines to zero again at twice the mean. It is peaked, like one would expect. It is bounded below at zero, 
bounded above at a reasonable value that is estimated, and is symmetric such that the mean is easy to interpret. It is appealing 
for handling willingness to pay parameters. Also with ß (i)= ß + ß v(i), where v(i) has support from -1 to +1, it does not matter if ß 
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Operators have a strong positive preference for owning and operating their own assets 
within an AMC and for being paid on the basis of best practice costs where operator costs 
differ. Furthermore the preference heterogeneity is most marked, as shown by the 
distributions in Figures 2 and 3. For best practice costing, the preference level has been 
conditioned on whether the operator is metropolitan or not. The positive parameter 
estimate for the decomposition of the mean (i.e., 1.0074), suggests, all other influences 
remaining constant, that the marginal utility associated with best practice costing is higher 
for metro operators than for non-metro operators. This is incorporated in Figure 3. The 
range of marginal utilities varies from 0.623 to 0.844 for asset ownership, and from 0.355 
to 1.383 for best practice costs. Hence the preference heterogeneity, while significant for 
both attributes, is much greater for best practice costing. The mean for each attribute is 
respectively 0.766 and 0.704, highlighting the potential for misleading inferences when 
reliance is on the mean of a distribution with a wide range of marginal utilities. The 
respective standard deviations are 0.059 and 0.476.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is negative or positive. A negative coefficient on v(i) simply reverses all the signs of the draws, but does 
not change the interpretation.  
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Table 2:  Illustrative Mixed Logit Model 
 
All random parameters have a triangular distribution, 10,000 Halton draws 
 Bus Alliances 
Attribute 
Mixed Logit  (Parameter (t 
stat)) 
Mean Random Parameters 
Equal voting rights - 
Voting rights based on # buses - 
Voting rights based on bus kms. - 
Voting rights based on size but maximum of 50% of voting 
rights - 
Management skills transferred to AMC - 
No sharing of day to day operations - 
Limited sharing of day to day operations - 
Extensive sharing of day to day operations - 
Substantial sharing of day to day operations - 
Retain historical rights to operate certain routes - 
All route rights transferred to AMC  - 
Regional growth equally shared amongst operators - 
Regional growth shared according to operator costs - 
Regional growth shared according to operator fleet size - 
Operators paid average of op costs within contract area - 
Operators paid highest of op costs within contract area - 
Operators paid best practice  of op costs within contract 
area 0.3683 (1.70) 
Assets owned and operated by each operator 0.80278 (2.42) 
Assets owned by each operator and leased to AMC - 
Assets owned by AMC and leased to each operator  - 
Revenue distributed based on operator costs - 
Revenue distributed based on operator fleet size - 
Revenue distributed based on operator performance - 
Bonus distributed based on operator costs - 
Bonus distributed based on operator fleet size - 
Bonus distributed based on operator performance - 
Penalty payments distributed based on operator costs - 
Penalty payments distributed based on operator fleet size - 
Penalty payments distributed based on operator 
performance - 
Fixed Parameters 
-  
Standard deviation of  Random Parameters 
Operators paid best practice  of op costs within contract 
area 0.3683 (1.70) 
Assets owned and operated by each operator 0.80278 (2.42) 
  
Heterogeneity around the mean decomposition parameters  
Operators paid best practice  of op costs within contract 
area *metropolitan  operator (1,0) 1.0074 (2.02) 
Heterogeneity around the mean decomposition parameters  
- - 
Heteroskedasticity  decomposition parameters  
- - 
Model fits 
No Observations 266 
LL(B) -164.98 
Pseudo R2 0.05 
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Figure 2:  Asset ownership preference profile 
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Figure 3:  Best practice costing preference profile 
 
One objective is to use the findings for each operator to establish the extent to which they 
would cooperate if they were required to work together under a single AMC.  Despite the 
limited sample size in the pilot survey, we can take specific operators within the sample and 
illustrate how the evidence can be used to establish the potential to cooperate. Essentially 
the cooperative spectrum is based on matching of aggregate utility from specific business 
propositions. With only two statistically significant influences, the results, while limiting, do 
serve to demonstrate the value of the approach. Figure 4 profiles the sample distribution of 
total utility associated with each of the three business propositions relative to a base of 
having assets not owned and operated by each operator and zero for not using best 
practice costing. The indexation in Tot U ij refers to the preference for ownership and 
operation of assets by operator (i=1) and best practice costing (j=1).  
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Figure 4:  Profile of aggregate utility for each AMC proposition  
 
The utility profiles in Figure 4 would be fed into equation (2) and the power weights 
estimated on all members of a specific AMC setting. We have done this for the sample and 
run two models – a simple multinomial logit (MNL) with a fixed parameter for the power 
or cooperation weight and a mixed logit (ML) model in which the weight is a random 
parameter. We found that the cooperation weight (or lambda), treated as generic across all 
four AMC propositions, has a mean estimate of 0.529 (t-value =3.705) from the MNL 
model and a mean of 0.516 (t-value = 3.628) from the ML model. We used a constrained 
triangular distribution in which the standard deviation of the parameter is the same as the 
mean. The cooperation weight distribution is shown in Figure 5. Thus on average, the 
value of 0.5 suggests that any pair of parties appear to bring equal influence to the table 
(given the randomized pairwise matching we undertook herein to illustrate the types of 
useful outputs).  
 
Of greater interest however is the cooperative strength on each of the four preference 
profiles in terms of best-practice cost and ownership and operation of assets. We find the 
following MNL and ML results (Table 5). There is clearly greater cooperation when both 
parties prefer to adopt best practice costing and well as maintain ownership and operations 
of ones’ own assets; with least cooperation (albeit not statistically significant) when both 
prefer best practice costing, but disagree on asset ownership and operations. The MNL and 
ML results are similar, which might be expected given the size of the sample and the 
limited attribute influences. 
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Table 5:  Cooperation (power) weights under alternative attribute preference profiles 
 
Assets 
owned/operated by 
operator 
Best practice costing MNL – fixed parameter ML – random parameter 
yes Yes 0.587 (2.8) 0.587 (2.80) 
yes No 0.423 (1.6) 0.439 (1.58) 
no Yes 0.230 (0.86) 0.247 (0.89) 
no No 0.625 (3.15) 0.631 (3.07) 
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Figure 5:  The cooperative (power) weight distribution 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper offers a way forward in investigating what bus and coach operators prefer in 
any business proposition that involves partnering with other operators in the delivery of 
services. The findings, although based on a small pilot sample, have broad applicability and 
are not limited to a specific institutional setting.  
 
Two aspects of contractual relationships between operators have been shown to be of 
especial importance in the establishment of AMCs. These are asset ownership and the basis 
of payment where partners’ operating costs differ. Asset ownership is shown to matter in 
negotiations, with a very strong preference for operators who currently own their own 
assets to want to hold onto them in any new partnership. This may be seen as a mechanism 
to protect one’s heritage in the industry, and until operators have experienced other 
regimes they lack the experience and will to risk a major divorce with their assets. In those 
Australian contexts where the assets are in government hands and made available to 
operators through service delivery contracts, as in Perth and Adelaide, those who have won 
these tenders have found a great deal of appeal in having no asset risk. Indeed the margins 
(defined by EBIT:revenue) are extremely attractive, in the 8-9% range, way above what 
one might normally expect when assets are owned by another party (Hensher 2005a). 
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Where the costs of potential alliance partners differ, operators have strong preference to be 
paid according to the costs of the best practice operator, providing incentives to all 
partners for cost convergence within the alliance region, and incorporating aspects of 
service quality into the payment model. 
 
It is premature to speculate on the substantive findings, but we now have an appealing 
method to progress our inquiry into this important theme of establishing trusting 
partnerships between operators, and in more general terms, between operators and 
regulators.  
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